I. Introduction
After publishing apparently accepted moral and legal arguments in support of a worldwide ban on torture in 2016, 1 our colleagues asked us to argue the opposite case. Posner had already argued that states had no moral obligation to any compliance with international law. 2 Further, Guzman argued it was unlikely that international law could influence any decisions of fundamental state importance, with any repeatable regularity. Having already published controversial arguments against a "rules-based order of international law," 5 this article's objective is for us to assess critically the force of any worldwide prohibition of torture. The right to freedom from torture is written in many human rights instruments. These instruments are said to protect all individuals from being intentionally subjected to severe physical or psychological distress by, or with the approval or acquiescence of, government agents acting for a specific purpose, including to inflict punishment or to obtain information. 6 The United Nations Convention International Law?, 55 Stan. l. Rev. 1901 (2003 . Id.
